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Summary. We study two allocation models. In the ﬁrst model, we consider
the problem of allocating an inﬁnitely divisible commodity among agents with
single-dipped preferences. In the second model, a degenerate case of the ﬁrst
one, we study the allocation of an indivisible object to a group of agents.
We consider rules that satisfy Pareto efﬁciency, strategy-proofness, and in
addition either the consistency property separability or the solidarity property
population-monotonicity.
We show that the class of rules that satisfy Pareto efﬁciency, strategy-
proofness, and separability equals the class of rules that satisfy Pareto efﬁciency,
strategy-proofness, and non-bossiness. We also provide characterizations of all
rules satisfying Pareto efﬁciency, strategy-proofness, and either separability or
population-monotonicity. Since any such rule consists for the largest part of serial-
dictatorship components, we can interpret the characterizations as impossibility
results.
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1 Introduction
Consider the allocation of a perfectly divisible commodity among a group of
agents with so-called “single-dipped” preferences: preferences are single-dipped
if alternatives can be ordered in such a way that every agent has a single worst
alternative, his dip amount, and his welfare strictly increases in either direction
away from his dip amount. For example, consider two types of work which
have negative cross-effects such as teaching and administration in a university:
combinations of the two types of work have lower utility than pure one-type
tasks. Yet other examples are two-good exchange economies with ﬁxed prices
and strictly quasi-convex utility functions, or exchange economies with classical
economic preferences but with “nonstandard”, kinked budget curves (see Klaus,
1998, Example 1.3); in both cases preferences, when restricted to the budget
curves, are single-dipped.
Although the domain of single-dipped preferences is less well-known than,
for instance, the domain of single-peaked preferences (e.g., Chun, 1998a; Klaus
1998; Thomson 1994, 1995a), there are interesting economic situations with
underlying single-dipped preferences. In a public good context Vickrey (1960)
refers to single-dipped preferences as “single-troughed”. Inada (1964) studies
single-dipped preferences over triples of alternatives.1 Peremans and Storcken
(1997) consider the problem of locating a public facility with strongly negative
externalities. These externalities induce single-dipped preferences on the set of
admissible locations.
For the problem of allocating an inﬁnitely divisible commodity among agents
with monotonic or single-peaked preferences a large class of rules satisfying nor-
matively appealing properties exist, e.g., the equal division rule for monotonic
preferences or the so called uniform rule for single-peaked preferences (Chun,
1998a; Klaus, 1998; Thomson, 1994, 1995a). In the case of single-dipped prefer-
ences, many combinations of properties force a rule to assign the whole amount
of the commodity to a single agent in a (sequentially) dictatorial way. This paper
pursues an axiomatic study of rules for economies with single-dipped prefer-
ences. In two earlier papers (Klaus, Peters, and Storcken, 1997; Klaus, 1999)
we started studying the trade-off between properties of rules for economies with
such preferences. Two central properties in this analysis are Pareto efﬁciency and
strategy-proofness. A rule is strategy-proof if no agent can ever gain by mis-
representing his preferences, irrespective of the preferences announced by the
other agents. Both properties are compatible for the model at hand, but the class
of Pareto efﬁcient and strategy-proof rules is large. This allows us to impose
further requirements on the class of rules. Klaus, Peters, and Storcken (1997)
and Klaus (1999) add several fairness properties (e.g., no-envy), replacement-
domination, consistency, weak non-bossiness in terms of welfare, and coalitional
strategy-proofness to the basic properties. In this paper we focus on separability,
non-bossiness, and population-monotonicity.
1 In Inada (1964) single-dipped preferences are called single-caved.Single-dippedness and indivisible objects 677
When comparing two economies that are deﬁned over the same set of agents,
separability requires the following. If each agent in a subgroup has the same
preference relation in both economies and the total amount assigned to this sub-
group is the same in both economies, then the amounts assigned to each agent
in the subgroup should be the same in both economies. A rule is non-bossy if an
agent cannot inﬂuence some other agent’s allotment without affecting his own
allotment. The solidarity property population-monotonicity requires that after the
arrival of new agents, either all agents initially present (weakly) gain together or
they all (weakly) lose together.
First we characterize the class of rules that satisfy Pareto efﬁciency, strategy-
proofness, and either non-bossiness or separability. Any such rule must allocate
the whole social endowment to a single agent. This assignment follows a proce-
dure that is partly serially dictatorial. Next, we study the impact of population-
monotonicity on Pareto efﬁcient and strategy-proof rules: the whole social en-
dowment must be assigned to a single agent. Again, any rule that satisﬁes all
the required properties can be decomposed into serially-dictatorial components.
Klaus, Peters, and Storcken (1997) and Klaus (1999) provide similar character-
izations involving the solidarity property replacement-domination, the incentive
properties coalitional strategy-proofness and (weak) non-bossiness in terms of
welfare, and consistency. We conclude the allocation model for the perfectly
divisible commodity with a brief discussion of other properties (converse con-
sistency and resource-monotonicity).
Finally, we discuss the problem of assigning one indivisible object to a group
of agents. This problem in itself would be interesting enough to study, but as we
show it is closely connected to the problem of allocating an inﬁnitely divisible
commodity among agents with single-dipped preferences. Because agents can
only report their preferences over the alternatives, “receiving the object” and “not
receiving the object”, Pareto efﬁciency implies strategy-proofness. Similarly as
before, we can characterize the class of rules that satisfy Pareto efﬁciency and
either non-bossiness or population-monotonicity.
2 Preliminaries
The model
There is a ﬁnite population of potential agents, indexed by P.B yP we denote
the class of non-empty subsets of P. Each agent i ∈ N is equipped with a
single-dipped preference relation Ri deﬁned over the non-negative real numbers
R+.2 Single-dippedness of Ri means that there exists a point d(Ri) ∈ R+, the
dip amount of agent i, with the following property: for all x,y ∈ R+ with x <
y ≤ d(Ri)o rx > y ≥ d(Ri) we have xP i y.3 By D we denote the class of all
2 Without loss of generality, we may assume that the agents’ preference relations are continuous
as well.
3 As usual, xR i y is interpreted as “x is weakly preferred to y”, and xP i y as “x is strictly
preferred to y”. Furthermore, xI i y means that agent i is indifferent between x and y.678 B. Klaus
single-dipped preference relations over R+. For N ∈ P , D N denotes the set of
(preference) proﬁles R =( Ri)i∈N such that for all i ∈ N, Ri ∈ D .
Let Ω ∈ R+ be the (social) endowment that has to be distributed among a
group of agents N ∈ P with proﬁle R ∈ D N. Now, an economy is a pair
e =( R,Ω) ∈ D N ×R+. Let E N := D N ×R+ and E :=

N∈P E N be the class




N xi = Ω.A nallocation rule ϕ,o rarule for short, is a function that
assigns to every e ∈ E a feasible allocation, denoted ϕ(e). Given i ∈ N, we call
ϕi(R) the allotment of agent i.
Pareto efﬁciency and strategy-proofness
We are interested in rules that select Pareto efﬁcient allocations: such an alloca-
tion cannot be changed in a way that makes no agent worse off and some agent
better off.
Pareto efﬁciency: For all N ∈ P and all e =( R,Ω) ∈ E N, there is no feasi-
ble allocation x ∈ RN
+ such that for all i ∈ N, xi Ri ϕi(e), and for some j ∈ N,
xj Pj ϕj(e).
First, we present a simple description of Pareto efﬁciency for our model.
For that purpose we “partition” the set of the agents. For each economy e =
(R,Ω) ∈ E N denote the set of agents who strictly prefer Ω t o0b yNΩ(e)=
{i ∈ N | Ω Pi 0}, the set of agents who are indifferent between 0 and Ω by
N0,Ω(e)={i ∈ N | 0Ii Ω}, and the set of agents who strictly prefer 0 to Ω
by N0(e)={i ∈ N | 0Pi Ω}. Hence, for all e =( R,Ω) ∈ E N, N = NΩ(e) ∪
N0,Ω(e) ∪ N0(e) and the sets NΩ(e), N0,Ω(e), and N0(e) are pairwise disjoint.4
Lemma 1 (Efﬁciency Lemma) A rule ϕ is Pareto efﬁcient if and only if for all
N ∈ P and all e =( R,Ω) ∈ E N the following holds:
Case 1 : If NΩ(e) / = ∅, then
for all i / ∈ NΩ(e), ϕi(e)=0and
for all i ∈ NΩ(e), either ϕi(e)=0or ϕi(e)Pi 0.5
Case 2 : If NΩ(e)=∅ and N0,Ω(e) / = ∅, then
for some j ∈ N0,Ω(e), ϕj(e)=Ω.
Case 3 : If N0(e)=N, then
for all i ∈ N, either ϕi(e)=Ω or ϕi(e)Pi Ω.6
Proof. See Klaus (1999), proof of Lemma 1.  
4 However, since some of the sets NΩ(e), N0,Ω(e), and N0(e) are possibly empty, strictly speaking,
{NΩ(e),N0,Ω(e),N0(e)} may not constitute a partition.
5 See Figure 1 a.
6 See Figure 1 b.Single-dippedness and indivisible objects 679
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Figure 1a,b. Pareto efﬁcient allotments as described in the Efﬁciency Lemma. a Efﬁciency Lemma,
Case 1: NΩ(e) / = ∅. Necessary conditions for Pareto efﬁciency of allotments for agents i,j ∈ NΩ(e),
xi,xj, are: xi ∈{ 0}∪(a,Ω] and xj ∈ [0,Ω]. b Efﬁciency Lemma, Case 3: N0(e)=N. Necessary
conditions for Pareto efﬁciency of allotments for agents k,l ∈ N0(e), yk,yl, are: yk ∈ [0,b) ∪{ Ω}
and yl ∈ [0,Ω]
Next, in addition to Pareto efﬁciency, we are interested in strategy-proofness.
Strategy-proofness states that no agent can ever beneﬁt from misrepresenting his
preferences.7 Before we give the formal deﬁnition, we introduce some notation.
For e =( R,Ω) ∈ E N, i ∈ N, and ¯ Ri ∈ D ,(¯ Ri,R−i) denotes the proﬁle ob-
tained from R by replacing Ri by ¯ Ri. We call ¯ R =(¯ Ri,R−i)a ni-deviation from R.
Strategy-proofness: For all N ∈ P , all e =( R,Ω), ¯ e =(¯ R,Ω) ∈ E N, and all
j ∈ N,i f¯ R is a j-deviation from R, then ϕj(e)Rj ϕj(¯ e).
A strengthening of strategy-proofness is the following condition of coalitional
strategy-proofness: no group of agents can ever beneﬁt from misrepresenting their
preferences.
Let M ⊆ N. For R ∈ D N the restriction (Ri)i∈M ∈ D M of R to M is
denoted by RM. Let C ⊆ N. Then, N\C = {i ∈ N | i / ∈ C}.
Coalitional strategy-proofness: For all N ∈ P , all e =( R,Ω) ∈ E N, and all
C ⊆ N there exists no ¯ e =( ¯ R,Ω) ∈ E N with ¯ RN\C = RN\C such that for all
i ∈ C, ϕi(¯ e)Ri ϕi(e) and for some j ∈ C, ϕj(¯ e)Pj ϕj(e).
7 In game theoretical terms, a rule is strategy-proof if in its associated direct revelation game
form, it is a weakly dominant strategy for each agent to announce his true preference relation.680 B. Klaus
The following result will be useful later on; if there are exactly two agents,
then a Pareto efﬁcient and strategy-proof rule ϕ assigns the whole endowment
to a single agent.
Let B 2
ϕ = {e =( R,Ω) ∈ E N | N ∈ P , |N| = 2, and for all i ∈ N,
ϕi(e) / = Ω} be the set of two-agent economies that yield a broken allocation
under ϕ, i.e., a feasible allocation where none of the agents obtains the whole
endowment.
Lemma 2 Let ϕ be a rule that satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency and strategy-proofness.
Then, B 2
ϕ = ∅.
Proof. Let ϕ satisfy the properties listed in the lemma and suppose, by contra-
diction, that B 2
ϕ / = ∅. Then, there exists (R,Ω) such that ϕ(R,Ω) is broken.
Since ϕ is Pareto efﬁcient we can apply the Efﬁciency Lemma. Since the broken
allocations in the description of the Efﬁciency Lemma can only occur in Cases
1 or 3, it follows that one of the following two cases holds.
(a) NΩ(R,Ω)=N = {i,j}. Then, ϕi(R,Ω)Pi 0 and ϕj(R,Ω)Pj 0. Consider an






Strategy-proofness for the i-deviation R1 from R implies ϕi(R1,Ω) ≤
ϕi(R,Ω). By NΩ(R1,Ω)=NΩ(R,Ω) and the Efﬁciency Lemma, it follows
that either ϕi(R1,Ω)=0o rϕi(R1,Ω)P1
i 0. The latter can only be true if
ϕi(R1,Ω) >ϕ i(R,Ω), which contradicts strategy-proofness. Hence, ϕi(R1,Ω)=
0 and ϕj(R1,Ω)=Ω.B ystrategy-proofness for the j-deviation R2 from R1,w e
have ϕj(R2,Ω)=Ω. Similarly, by interchanging the roles of i and j, it follows
that ϕi(R2,Ω)=Ω, which is a contradiction.
(b) N0(R,Ω)=N = {i,j}. Then, ϕi(R,Ω)Pi Ω and ϕj(R,Ω)Pj Ω. Consider an






Strategy-proofness for the i-deviation R1 from R implies ϕi(R1,Ω) ≥
ϕi(R,Ω). By N0(R1,Ω)=N and the Efﬁciency Lemma, it follows that either
ϕi(R1,Ω)=Ω or ϕi(R1,Ω)P1
i Ω. The latter can only be true if ϕi(R1,Ω) <
ϕi(R,Ω), which contradicts strategy-proofness. Hence, ϕi(R1,Ω)=Ω.B y
strategy-proofness for the j-deviation R2 from R1, we have ϕi(R2,Ω)=Ω.
Similarly, by interchanging the roles of i and j, it follows that ϕj(R2,Ω)=Ω,
which is a contradiction.  
As we will see later, the result of Lemma 2 does not hold for economies with
more than two agents (see Example 4).
3 Separability and non-bossiness
Our next goal is to characterize the class of rules that satisfy Pareto efﬁciency,
strategy-proofness, and either one of two additional properties: separability or
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of consistency. Consistency states that if a group of agents leaves a given econ-
omy with their allotments, then the allotments of the remaining agents are not
redistributed by the rule in the new, “reduced” economy. For a recent survey of
the literature on consistency we refer to Thomson (1996).
Let M,N ∈ P be such that M   N. For x ∈ RN the restriction
(xi)i∈M ∈ RM of x to M is denoted by xM.




For a further discussion of consistency for this model we refer to Klaus,
Peters, and Storcken (1997). Here, we study a weaker consistency property called
separability.
It requires that if for two economies with the same set of agents each agent
in a subgroup has the same preference relation in both economies and the to-
tal amount assigned to this subgroup is the same in both economies, then the
amounts assigned to each agent in the subgroup should be the same in both
economies.
Separability: For all M,N ∈ P with M   N and all e =( R,Ω), ¯ e =(¯ R, ¯ Ω) ∈




M ϕi(¯ e), then for all i ∈ M, ϕi(e)=ϕi(¯ e).
Separability was introduced by Moulin (1987) in the context of surplus shar-
ing. Chun (1998a,b,1999) studies separability in the contexts of economies with
single-peaked preferences, quasi-linear choice, and bankruptcy.
It follows easily that consistency implies separability.
Lemma 3 Let ϕ be a rule that satisﬁes consistency. Then ϕ satisﬁes separability.
Proof. The proof is essentially “model-free”. See for instance Chun (1998a),
proof of Lemma 6.  
Next, we show that separability implies non-bossiness. A rule is called bossy
if an agent, by changing his announcement, can affect the allotments of the re-
maining agents without changing his own allotment. A rule that does not allow
for this kind of inﬂuence is called non-bossy. This concept of (non-)bossiness
was introduced by Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981).
Non-bossiness: For all N ∈ P , all e =( R,Ω), ¯ e =( ¯ R,Ω) ∈ E N, and all
j ∈ N,i f¯ R is a j-deviation from R and ϕj(e)=ϕj(¯ e), then for all i ∈ N\{j},
ϕi(e)=ϕi(¯ e).
In Klaus (1999) we consider the following weakening of non-bossiness. Weak
non-bossiness in terms of welfare states that no agent can inﬂuence some other
agent’s welfare without affecting his own allotment.682 B. Klaus
Weak non-bossiness in terms of welfare: For all N ∈ P , all e =( R,Ω), ¯ e =
(¯ R,Ω) ∈ E N, and all j ∈ N,i f¯ R is a j-deviation from R and ϕj(e)=ϕj(¯ e),
then for all i ∈ N\{j}, ϕi(e)Ii ϕi(¯ e).
In the sequel we use the shorter phrase of weak non-bossiness for weak non-
bossiness in terms of welfare. For a further discussion of weak non-bossiness for
this model we refer to Klaus (1999). It is obvious that non-bossiness implies
weak non-bossiness. We prove next, that separability implies non-bossiness.
Lemma 4 Let ϕ be a rule that satisﬁes separability. Then ϕ satisﬁes non-
bossiness.
Note that the proof of the lemma is essentially “model-free”.
Proof. Let ϕ satisfy separability and let N ∈ P , e =( R,Ω), ¯ e =(¯ R,Ω) ∈ E N,
and j ∈ N. Furthermore, let ¯ R be a j-deviation from R and ϕj(e)=ϕj(¯ e). Hence,




N\{j} ϕi(¯ e). Thus, by separability, for
all i ∈ N\{j}, ϕi(e)=ϕi(¯ e). This proves non-bossiness.  
Before we characterize the class of rules that satisfy Pareto efﬁciency,
strategy-proofness, and either separability or non-bossiness, we recall the char-
acterization of the class of Pareto efﬁcient, strategy-proof rules that satisfy either
weak non-bossiness or coalitional strategy-proofness; see Klaus (1999).
Let N ∈ P and e ∈ E N. A rule that satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency, strategy-
proofness, and weak non-bossiness, assigns the whole endowment to a single
agent. The selection of this agent can be described as follows.
We ﬁx a linear order of the set of agents and ask the agent who is ﬁrst
in this order whether he prefers Ω to 0. If he does, he receives it and we are
done. If not, we ask the second agent the same question; etc.. Hence, the ﬁrst
agent according to the ﬁxed order who prefers the whole endowment to receiving
nothing receives it.
If no agent strictly prefers Ω to 0 and at least one agent is indifferent between
0 and Ω, then the endowment can be assigned to any of the indifferent agents.
If all agents strictly prefer 0 to Ω, there exists a preselected agent who
receives it. Loosely speaking, he is the “scapegoat”.
For a formal description, we need some extra notation. Let N ∈ P and
e ∈ E N.Apermutation πN on N is a bijective function πN :N → N.B yΠN
we denote the set of all permutations on N. Since for πN ∈ ΠN and i ∈ N,
πN(i) can also be interpreted as the position of i in a linear order on N,w e
alternatively refer to πN as to the linear order on N.B yGN we denote the set
of choice functions gN : E N → N such that gN(e) ∈ N0,Ω(e)i fN0,Ω(e) / = ∅.
Selection f
πN,gN,k
N: Let N ∈ P and let πN ∈ ΠN, gN ∈ GN, and kN ∈ N.
Then the selection fπN,gN,kN : E N → N (based on πN, gN, and kN) is deﬁned as
follows. Let e ∈ E N.Single-dippedness and indivisible objects 683
Case 1: If NΩ(e) / = ∅, then fπN,gN,kN(e)=a r gm i n {πN(i) | i ∈ NΩ(e)}.
Case 2: If NΩ(e)=∅ and N0,Ω(e) / = ∅, then fπN,gN,kN(e)=gN(e).
Case 3: If N = N0(e), then fπN,gN,kN(e)=kN.
Note that in Case 1 the selection rule equals a serial-dictatorship. Also Case
3 can be interpreted as (degenerated) serially dictatorial.
Theorem 1 Let ϕ be a rule. Then the following statements are equivalent.
(i) ϕ satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency and coalitional strategy-proofness.
(ii) ϕ satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency, strategy-proofness, and weak non-bossiness.
(iii) For all N ∈ P and all Ω ∈ R+ there exist πN ∈ ΠN, gN ∈ GN, and
kN ∈ N such that for all e =( R,Ω) ∈ E N, ϕ assigns Ω to agent fπN,gN,kN(e),
i.e.,
ϕfπN ,gN ,kN (e)(e)=Ω. (1)
Proof. See Klaus (1999), proof of Theorem 1.  
Since separability implies non-bossiness (Lemma 4), and therefore weak non-
bossiness, the class of rules that satisfy Pareto efﬁciency, strategy-proofness, and
either separability or non-bossiness must be contained in the class of rules as
described in Theorem 1; in fact, it is a strict subclass. The difference lies in
the selection of the agent who receives the whole endowment when none of
the agents strictly prefers the endowment above receiving nothing and there are
agents that are indifferent. In this case, the selection of the agent must be non-
bossy, i.e., if an agent that is not selected changes his preference relation in such
a way that he is still not selected, then this deviation must not change the original
selection (a change of the selection after the unilateral deviation of the agent who
is not receiving the endowment would be bossy). In order to satisfy separability
and non-bossiness for rules as described in Theorem 1 we restrict the class of
choice functions that are admissable for the selection as follows. By ¯ GN we
denote the set of non-bossy choice functions ¯ gN : E N → N, i.e.,¯ gN ∈ GN and
for all e =( R,Ω), ¯ e =(¯ R,Ω) ∈ E N, and all j ∈ N,i f¯ R is a j-deviation from R,
j / =¯ gN(e), and j / =¯ gN(¯ e), then ¯ gN(e)=¯ gN(¯ e).
Theorem 2 Let ϕ be a rule. Then the following statements are equivalent.
(i) ϕ satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency, strategy-proofness, and separability.
(ii) ϕ satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency, strategy-proofness, and non-bossiness.
(iii) For all N ∈ P and all Ω ∈ R+ there exist πN ∈ ΠN, gN ∈ ¯ GN, and
kN ∈ N such that for all e =( R,Ω) ∈ E N, ϕ assigns Ω to agent fπN,gN,kN(e),
i.e.,
ϕfπN ,gN ,kN (e)(e)=Ω. (2)
Proof. Assume that ϕ satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency, strategy-proofness, and separa-
bility. By Lemma 4 it follows that ϕ satisﬁes non-bossiness. Hence, (i) implies
(ii).684 B. Klaus
Assume that ϕ satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency, strategy-proofness, and non-bossi-
ness. Then ϕ satisﬁes weak non-bossiness and by Theorem 1, for all N ∈ P
and all Ω ∈ R+ there exist πN ∈ ΠN, gN ∈ GN, and kN ∈ N such that for all
e =( R,Ω) ∈ E N, ϕfπN ,gN ,kN (e)(e)=Ω. Non-bossiness implies that gN must be a
non-bossy selection. Thus, gN ∈ ¯ GN. Hence, (ii) implies (iii).
Let N ∈ P , Ω ∈ R+, πN ∈ ΠN, gN ∈ ¯ GN, and kN ∈ N be such that for
all e =( R,Ω) ∈ E N, ϕfπN ,gN ,kN (e)(e)=Ω. It is easy, but tedious, to prove that
ϕ satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency, strategy-proofness, and separability. We leave this
part of the proof to the reader. Hence, (iii) implies (i).  
4 Population-monotonicity
In this section we study the solidarity property population-monotonicity.I ti n -
corporates a notion of solidarity among agents when changes in the population
occur, e.g., if a group of agents leave, then, after this change, either all remaining
agents are made (weakly) better off or they all are made (weakly) worse off.
Population-monotonicity: For all N,M ∈ P , all e =( R,Ω) ∈ E N, and
all ¯ e =( ¯ R,Ω) ∈ E M,i fM   N and RM = ¯ R, then either [for all i ∈ M,
ϕi(e)Ri ϕi(¯ e)] or [for all i ∈ M, ϕi(¯ e)Ri ϕi(e)].
Thomson (1983) introduced population-monotonicity in the context of bar-
gaining. The notion of population-monotonicity we introduce above is due to
Chun (1986) who calls it “solidarity”. For a survey on population-monotonicity
we refer to Thomson (1995b).
First, we show that a rule ϕ that satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency, strategy-proofness,
and population-monotonicity assigns the whole endowment to a single agent.
Let Bϕ = {e =( R,Ω) ∈ E N | N ∈ P and for all i ∈ N, ϕi(e) / = Ω} be the
set of economies that yield a broken allocation under ϕ, i.e., a feasible allocation
where no agent obtains the whole endowment.
Lemma 5 Let ϕ be a rule that satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency, strategy-proofness, and
population-monotonicity. Then, Bϕ = ∅.
Proof. Let ϕ satisfy the properties listed in the lemma and suppose by contra-
diction that Bϕ / = ∅.
Since Bϕ / = ∅, there exist N ∈ P , e =( R,Ω) ∈ E N, and i,j ∈ N such
that ϕi(e) / = 0 and ϕj(e) / = 0. By the Efﬁciency Lemma, either (a) ϕi(e)Pi 0 and
ϕj(e)Pj 0o r(b) ϕi(e)Pi Ω and ϕj(e)Pj Ω.
Now, let M = {i,j} and consider ¯ e =( RM,Ω) ∈ E M.B ypopulation-
monotonicity, either [ϕi(e)Ri ϕi(¯ e) and ϕj(e)Rj ϕj(¯ e)] or [ϕi(¯ e)Ri ϕi(e) and
ϕj(¯ e)Rj ϕj(e)].
Since ¯ e is a two-agent economy, by Lemma 2, it follows that either [ϕi(¯ e)=Ω
and ϕj(¯ e)=0 ]o r[ ϕi(¯ e)=0a n dϕj(¯ e)=Ω]. This is in contradiction to (a) and
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Lemma 6 Let ϕ be a rule that satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency, strategy-proofness, and
population-monotonicity. Then ϕ satisﬁes weak non-bossiness.
Proof. Let ϕ satisfy Pareto efﬁciency, strategy-proofness, and population-mo-
notonicity. Let e =( R,Ω), ¯ e =( ¯ R,Ω) ∈ E N, and j ∈ N be such that ¯ R is a
j-deviation from R and ϕj(e)=ϕj(¯ e). By Lemma 5, Bϕ = ∅. Hence, either
ϕj(e)=ϕj(¯ e)=1o rϕj(e)=ϕj(¯ e) = 0. In order to prove weak non-bossiness,
we have to show that for all i ∈ N\{j}, ϕi(e)Ii ϕi(¯ e). If ϕj(e)=ϕj(¯ e) = 1, then
for all i ∈ N\{j}, ϕi(e)=ϕi(¯ e)=0 .L e tϕj(e)=ϕj(¯ e) = 0. Suppose, by contra-
diction, that there exist k,l ∈ N\{j} such that ϕk(e)Pk ϕk(¯ e) and ϕl(¯ e)Pl ϕl(e).
Hence, by Pareto efﬁciency, either k,l ∈ NΩ(e)o rk,l ∈ N0(e). First, consider
eN\{j} =( RN\{j},Ω) ∈ E N.B ypopulation-monotonicity, ϕk(eN\{j})=ϕk(e)
and ϕl(eN\{j})=ϕl(e). Next, consider ¯ eN\{j} =( ¯ RN\{j},Ω) ∈ E N.B y
population-monotonicity, ϕk(¯ eN\{j})=ϕk(¯ e) and ϕl(¯ eN\{j})=ϕl(¯ e). Thus,
ϕk(eN\{j})Pk ϕk(¯ eN\{j}) and ϕl(¯ eN\{j})Pl ϕl(eN\{j}). This is in contradiction
to eN\{j} =¯ eN\{j}.  
Next, we characterize the class of Pareto efﬁcient, strategy-proof, and popu-
lation-monotonic rules.
As proven in Lemma 5, a rule that satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency, strategy-
proofness, and population-monotonicity, assigns the whole endowment to a single
agent. The selection of this agent can be described as follows. Let N ∈ P be a
set of agents and e =( R,Ω) ∈ E N an economy.
By Pareto efﬁciency, the endowment Ω should be allotted to an agent who
prefers Ω to 0, if there is such an agent. Among these agents, if there are several,
the choice is made with respect a linear order π+ on P, the set of potential agents.
We ask the ﬁrst agent according to π+ who is a member of N, whether he
prefers Ω to 0. If he does, he receives it and we are done. If not, we ask the
second agent according to π+ who is a member of N the same question; etc..
Hence, the ﬁrst agent in the order π+ who is in N and prefers the endowment to
receiving nothing receives it.
If no agent in N strictly prefers Ω to 0 and at least one agent in N is
indifferent between 0 and Ω, then the endowment is assigned to an agent who
is indifferent between 0 and Ω.
Finally, if all agents in N strictly prefer 0 to Ω, then Ω is assigned to an
agent with respect to a linear order π− on P. Now, the ﬁrst agent in the order
who is in N receives the endowment.
For a formal description, we introduce the following notation.
Let ΠP denote the set of all permutations, or linear orders,o nP. We call
G := {gN ∈ GN}N∈P a collection of choice functions.
Selection fπ+,G ,π−: Let π+,π − ∈ ΠP and G = {gN ∈ GN}N∈P . Then, the
selection fπ+,G ,π− (based on π+,π −, and G ) is deﬁned as follows. Let N ∈ P
and e =( R,Ω) ∈ E N.
Case 1: If NΩ(e) / = ∅, then fπ+,G ,π−(e)=a r gm i n {π+(i) | i ∈ NΩ(e)}.686 B. Klaus
Case 2: If NΩ(e)=∅ and N0,Ω(e) / = ∅, then fπ+,G ,π−(e)=gN(e).
Case 3: If N0(e)=N, then fπ+,G ,π−(e)=a r gm i n {π−(i) | i ∈ N0(e)}.
Theorem 3 A rule ϕ satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency, strategy-proofness, and popula-
tion-monotonicity if and only if for all Ω ∈ R+ there exist π+,π − ∈ ΠP and
G = {gN ∈ GN}N∈P such that for all N ∈ P and all e =( R,Ω) ∈ E N, ϕ
assigns Ω to agent fπ+,G ,π− (e), i.e.,
ϕfπ+,G ,π−(e)(e)=Ω. (3)
Proof. Assume that ϕ satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency, strategy-proofness, and popu-
lation-monotonicity. By Lemma 6 it follows that ϕ satisﬁes weak non-bossiness.
Hence, by Theorem 1, for all N ∈ P and all Ω ∈ R+ there exist πN ∈ ΠN,
gN ∈ GN, and kN ∈ N such that for all e =( R,Ω) ∈ E N,
ϕfπN ,gN ,kN (e)(e)=Ω. (4)
Let Ω ∈ R+. We prove that there exist π+,π − ∈ ΠP and G = {gN ∈ GN}N∈P
such that for all N ∈ P and all e =( R,Ω) ∈ E N, fπ+,G ,π− (e) = fπN,gN,kN(e)
and ϕfπ+,G ,π−(e)(e)=Ω.
(a) Deﬁnition of π+∈ Π
P.
We prove that π+ = πP ∈ ΠP where πP is the order obtained from (4) for N =
P. Suppose, by contradiction, that there exist N ∈ P and e =( R,Ω) ∈ E N such
that NΩ(e) / = ∅ and fπN,gN,kN(e)=a r gm i n {πN(i) | i ∈ NΩ(e)} / = argmin{πP(i) |
i ∈ NΩ(e)}). Hence, N  P . Consider the economy ¯ e =(¯ R,Ω) ∈ E P such that
¯ RN = R and NΩ(¯ e)=NΩ(e). Then, by (4), ϕfπP,gP,kP(¯ e)(¯ e)=Ω and fπP,gP,kP(¯ e)=
argmin{πP(i) | i ∈ NΩ(¯ e)})=a r gm i n {πP(i) | i ∈ NΩ(e)}.
By population-monotonicity, fπP,gP,kP(¯ e)=fπN,gN,kN(e). Hence, argmin{πP(i)
| i ∈ NΩ(¯ e)} = argmin{πN(i) | i ∈ NΩ(e)}. This is a contradiction.
(b) Deﬁnition of G .
For each N ∈ P consider gN ∈ GN as described in (4). Then, the collection
of choice functions G equals {gN ∈ GN}N∈P .
(c) Deﬁnition of π−∈ Π
P.
By (4), for all e =( R,Ω) ∈ E P such that N0(e)=P, ϕkP(e)=Ω. Set π−(kP)=1 .
Next, consider N  Psuch that kP ∈ N and ¯ e =( ¯ R,Ω) ∈ E N such that
N0(¯ e)=N. Then, by population-monotonicity, ϕkP(¯ e)=Ω.
Next, let P1 := P\{kP}. Then, by (4), for all e =( R,Ω) ∈ E P
1
such that
N0(e)=P1, ϕkP1(e)=Ω. Set π−(kP
1
) = 2. Similarly as before it follows that
for all N   P1 such that kP
1
∈ N and ¯ e =(¯ R,Ω) ∈ E N such that N0(¯ e)=N,
ϕkP1(¯ e)=Ω.
Let P2 := P1\{kP
1
}. Then, by (4), for all e =( R,Ω) ∈ E P
2
such that
N0(e)=P2, ϕkP2(e)=Ω. Set π−(i3)=3 .
It is now clear how the linear order π− ∈ ΠP is constructed step by step by
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for all N ∈ P and all e =( R,Ω) ∈ E N such that N0(e)=N, ϕfπN ,gN ,kN (e)(e)=Ω
and fπN,gN,kN(e)=a r gm i n {π−(i) | i ∈ N0(R)}.
(d) By (a), (b), and (c) it follows easily, that for each N ∈ P and all e =
(R,Ω) ∈ E N, fπ+,G ,π− (e) = fπN,gN,kN(e) and ϕfπ+,G ,π−(e)(e)=Ω.
Let Ω ∈ R+. Let π+,π − ∈ ΠP and G = {gN ∈ GN}N∈P be such that for
all N ∈ P and all e =( R,Ω) ∈ E N, ϕfπ+,G ,π−(e)(e)=Ω. It is easy, but tedious,
to prove that ϕ satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency, strategy-proofness, and population-
monotonicity. We leave this part of the proof to the reader.  
Remark 1 Note that any Pareto efﬁcient, strategy-proof, and population-mono-
tonic rule as described in Theorem 3 in addition satisﬁes coalitional strategy-
proofness and weak non-bossiness. However, a rule as described in Theorem 3
does not necessarily satisfy separability or non-bossiness (see Theorem 2). It
is also clear that a rule that satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency, strategy-proofness, and
either non-bossiness or separability (see Theorem 2) does not necessarily satisfy
population-monotonicity.
5 Other properties and logical relations
First, we show that the classes of rules that we characterize in Sections 3 and
4 are non-empty. In the following example, we describe a rule that satisﬁes all
properties stated in the theorems.
Example 1 The following rule ϕ satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency, (coalitional) strategy-
proofness, (weak) non-bossiness, separability, and population-monotonicity. For
all N ∈ P and all e =( R,Ω) ∈ E N:
Case 1 : If NΩ(e) / = ∅, then ϕmin assigns Ω to agent min{i | i ∈ NΩ(e)}.
Case 2 : If NΩ(e)=∅,N 0,Ω(e) / = ∅, then ϕmin assigns Ω to agent min{i | i ∈
N0,Ω(e)}.
Case 3 : If N = N0(e), then ϕmin assigns Ω to agent min{i | i ∈ N0(e)}.
By id∈ ΠP we denote the identity permutation deﬁned by id(i) = i for all
i ∈ P. Let π+ = π− =i d∈ ΠP and deﬁne gN
min ∈ GN such that for all N ∈ P
and all e =( R,Ω) ∈ E N, gN
min(e) = min{i | i ∈ N0,Ω(e)} if N0,Ω(e) / = ∅ and
gN
min(e) = min{i | i ∈ N} otherwise. Let G   = {gN
min}N∈P . Now choosing for all
Ω ∈ R+ the selection fid,G  ,id yields for all N ∈ P and all e =( R,Ω) ∈ E N,
ϕmin(e)=ϕfid,G  ,id(e)(e)=Ω. ♦
The following examples show that the characterizations given in Theorems
2 and 3 are tight, i.e., dropping any of the properties yields alternative rules.
Example 2 The following rule ϕ satisﬁes (coalitional) strategy-proofness, (weak)
non-bossiness, separability, and population-monotonicity, but not Pareto ef-
ﬁciency. For all N ∈ P and all e =( R,Ω) ∈ E N,ϕassigns Ω to agent
min{i | i ∈ N}. ♦688 B. Klaus
Example 3 The following rule ϕ satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency, (weak) non-bossiness,
separability, and population-monotonicity, but not (coalitional) strategy-proof-
ness. For all N ∈ P and all e =( R,Ω) ∈ E Nsuch that NΩ(e) / = ∅, let N 1
Ω(e)=
{i ∈ NΩ(e) | d(Ri)=0 } and N 2
Ω(e)={i ∈ NΩ(e) | d(Ri) / =0 }. Then, for all
N ∈ P and all e =( R,Ω) ∈ E N, we deﬁne ϕ(e) as follows. If N 1
Ω(e) / = ∅, then
ϕ assigns Ω to agent min





Ω(e)=∅ and N 2
Ω(e) / = ∅, then
ϕ assigns Ω to agent min

i | i ∈ N 2
Ω(e}

. For all remaining e =( R,Ω) ∈ E N,
ϕ(e)=ϕmin(e). ♦
Example 4 The following rule ˜ ϕ satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency, strategy-proofness,
but not (weak) non-bossiness, not separability, and not population-monotonicity.












For all remaining e =( R,Ω) ∈ E N, ˜ ϕ(e)=ϕmin(e). ♦
As shown in Klaus, Peters, and Storcken (1997) and in Klaus (1998) the
class of rules described in Theorem 3 almost equals the class of rules that satisfy
Pareto efﬁciency, strategy-proofness, and consistency. The only difference in the
description of the class of Pareto efﬁcient, strategy-proof, and consistent rules
is a restriction of the admissible collections of choice rules. If a rule satisﬁes
consistency, then also its collection of choice rules must be “consistent”.
Next, we discuss a property that is related to consistency, namely converse
consistency. Converse consistency determines the desirability of an allocation on
the basis of the desirability of its restrictions to all two-agent reduced economies.
Converse consistency: For all N ∈ P , all e =( R,Ω) ∈ E N, and all feasible
allocations x ∈ RN




The property of converse consistency is reviewed in Thomson (1996).
As the following example shows, a Pareto efﬁcient, strategy-proof, and con-
versely consistent rule does not necessarily always assign the whole endowment
to a single agent.
Example 5 The following allocation rule ϕ satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency, strategy-
proofness, and converse consistency. Let T1 = {1,2}, T2 = {2,3}, and T3 =
{1,3}. For all e1 =( R1,Ω) ∈ E T1 such that NΩ(e1)=T1, let ϕ1(e1)=Ω,
for all e2 =( R2,Ω) ∈ E T2 such that NΩ(e2)=T2, let ϕ2(e2)=Ω, and for all
e3 =( R3,Ω) ∈ E T3 such that NΩ(e3)=T3, let ϕ3(e3)=Ω. For all remaining
economies e =( R,Ω) ∈ E N, N ∈ P , let ϕ(e)= ˜ ϕ(e), where ˜ ϕ is deﬁned in
Example 4.
The proof that ϕ satisﬁes converse consistency is easy. It is based on the
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Case 1: The allocation assigned for an economy e ∈ E N, where N ∈ P and
|N| > 2, is consistent with the choice for all two-agent economies (if {1,2,3}∩
N / = {1,2,3}).
Case 2: There exists no allocation that satisﬁes the hypothesis of converse con-
sistency, namely, that the allocation for each reduced two-agent economy equals
the restriction of the allocation to this set (this follows from the “cycle” we
constructed for the two-agent subsets of {1,2,3}). ♦
We conclude this section with the discussion of the solidarity property
resource-monotonicity. Resource-monotonicity describes the effect of a change
in the endowment on the welfare of the agents. If after such a change either all
agents (weakly) lose together or all (weakly) gain together, then the rule satisﬁes
resource-monotonicity.
Resource-monotonicity: For all N ∈ N , all e =( R,Ω) ∈ E N, and all
¯ e =( R, ¯ Ω) ∈ E N, either [for all i ∈ N, ϕi(e)Ri ϕi(¯ e)] or [for all i ∈ N,
ϕi(¯ e)Ri ϕi(e)].
Conditions of resource-monotonicity have been studied by Chun and Thom-
son (1988), Moulin and Thomson (1988), Roemer (1986), and Thomson (1978,
1994).
The following example shows that Pareto efﬁciency, strategy-proofness, and
resource-monotonicity are not compatible.
Example 6 Suppose the rule ϕ satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency, strategy-proofness, and
resource-monotonicity. Let N = {1,2}, Ω =1 , ¯ Ω = 2, and e =( R,Ω) ∈ E N be
such that 2P1 1P1 0 and 2P2 0P2 1. Consider e =( R,Ω). By Pareto efﬁciency,
ϕ1(e)=Ω. Next, consider e  =( R, ¯ Ω). By Lemma 2, ϕi(e )= ¯ Ω for some i ∈ N.
Then, by resource-monotonicity, ϕ1(e )= ¯ Ω. Now, consider the 2-deviation ¯ R
from R such that ¯ R2 = R1. Consider ¯ e =( ¯ R, ¯ Ω). Then, by strategy-proofness,
ϕ1(¯ e)= ¯ Ω.
Next, consider ˜ R ∈ D N such that ˜ R1 = R2 and ˜ R2 = R1. Consider ˜ e =(˜ R,Ω).
By Pareto efﬁciency, ϕ2(˜ e)=Ω. Next, consider ˜ e  =( ˜ R, ¯ Ω). By Lemma 2,
ϕi(˜ e )= ¯ Ω for some i ∈ N. Then, by resource-monotonicity, ϕ2(˜ e )= ¯ Ω. Now,
¯ R is a 1-deviation from ˜ R such that ¯ R1 = ˜ R2 = R1. Consider ¯ e =(¯ R, ¯ Ω). Then,
by strategy-proofness, ϕ2(¯ e)= ¯ Ω. This is in contradiction to ϕ1(¯ e)= ¯ Ω. ♦
6 The assignment of an indivisible object
Consider the well-known problem of allocating an indivisible commodity or ob-
ject among a group of agents, e.g., a task or a real object. Obviously, this problem
is closely related to the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences we in-
troduced in Section 2 (see Lemmas 2 and 5 and Theorems 1, 2, and 3).
In order to keep this section self-contained, we brieﬂy introduce the model.
An indivisible object Ω has to be allocated among a non-empty and ﬁnite set690 B. Klaus
N ∈ P of agents. Each agent i ∈ N is equipped with a preference relation
Ri deﬁned over the two alternatives “receiving nothing”, denoted by 0, and
“receiving the object”, denoted by Ω. Hence, for each agent i ∈ N either 0Pi Ω,
0Ii Ω,o rΩ Pi 0. By R{0,Ω} we denote the set of preference relations over
{0,Ω} and RN
{0,Ω} denotes the set of (preference) proﬁles R =( Ri)i∈N such
that for all i ∈ N, Ri ∈ R{0,Ω}. Thus, the class of all economies is denoted by
E = ∪N∈P RN
{0,Ω}.
Let N ∈ P .Afeasible allocation for R ∈ RN
{0,Ω} is an assignment of the
object Ω to exactly one of the agents i ∈ N. Note that it is without loss of
generality that free disposal of the commodity is not allowed. An assignment
rule ϕ is a function that assigns to every R ∈ RN
{0,Ω} a feasible allocation,
denoted ϕ(R). Note that either ϕi(R)=0o rϕi(R)=Ω. Properties of assignment
rules and further notation are as deﬁned in the previous sections.
It is easy to show that Theorems 2 and 3 remain true for assignment rules.
Before stating this result as a corollary, we note that for the simple model we
consider here, Pareto efﬁciency implies strategy-proofness.
Lemma 7 Let ϕ be an assignment rule that satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency. Then ϕ
satisﬁes strategy-proofness.
Proof. See Klaus (1999), proof of Lemma 5.  
Corollary 1 Let ϕ be an assignment rule. Then the following statements are
equivalent.
(i) ϕ satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency and separability.
(ii) ϕ satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency and non-bossiness.
(iii) For all N ∈ P there exist πN ∈ ΠN, gN ∈ ¯ GN, and kN ∈ N such that for
all R ∈ RN
{0,Ω}, ϕ assigns Ω to agent fπN,gN,kN(R), i.e.,
ϕfπN ,gN ,kN (R)(R)=Ω. (6)
Corollary 2 An assignment rule ϕ satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency and population-
monotonicity if and only if there exist π+,π − ∈ ΠP and G = {gN ∈ GN}N∈P
such that for all N ∈ P and all R ∈ RN
{0,Ω}, ϕ assigns Ω to agent fπ+,G ,π− (R),
i.e.,
ϕfπ+,G ,π−(R)(R)=Ω. (7)
The rule ϕmin as described in Example 1 is an example of an assignment rule
that satisﬁes all properties stated in Corollaries 1 and 2. Example 2 shows the in-
dependence of Pareto efﬁciency from separability, non-bossiness, and population-
monotonicity. However, in order to prove the independence of separability, non-
bossiness, and population-monotonicity from Pareto efﬁciency we need a new
example.
Example 7 The following rule ϕ satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency, but not separability,
not non-bossiness, and not population-monotonicity. Without loss of generality,Single-dippedness and indivisible objects 691
we deﬁne ϕ(R) for N = {1,2,3}. Let R ∈ RN
{0,Ω}.I fNΩ(R) / = ∅ and |NΩ(R)| >
1, then
ϕ1(R)=Ω if Ω P1 0,
ϕ2(R)=Ω if 0I1 Ω,
ϕ3(R)=Ω if 0P1 Ω,
(8)
and ϕ(R)=ϕmin(R) otherwise. ♦
Remark 2 P´ apai (1998) considers the problem of allocating an indivisible com-
modity, or object, where agents are not indifferent between the alternatives “re-
ceiving nothing” and “receiving the object” and where free disposal is allowed.
For this model she proves that the class of rules that satisfy Pareto efﬁciency,
strategy-proofness, and non-bossiness equals the class of serial dictatorships
(P´ apai, 1998, Proposition 2). Furthermore, P´ apai (1998) studies the trade-off
between the properties Pareto efﬁciency, strategy-proofness, non-bossiness, and
non-dictatorship.
Restricting our model to the model of P´ apai (1998), the class of rules de-
scribed in Corollary 1 equals the serial dictatorships described in P´ apai (1998).
The proofs of this result are different
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